

## Towards a New Balance: The Role of the DPD in Indonesian Democracy

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**Abstract.** This article focuses on the problem that the role of the Regional Representative Council (DPD) in the dynamics of democracy in Indonesia is experiencing an imbalance in its relationship with the government and other people's representative institutions such as the People's Representative Council (DPR). The research methods used include literature studies, conceptual analysis, case studies, and document analysis. With a qualitative approach and descriptive analysis, this research aims to understand the role that the DPD should play in the dynamics of Indonesian democracy. The research results show that the practice of democracy in Indonesia has experienced ups and downs from tyranny to anarchy, and vice versa, namely conditions that are not ideal and unbalanced (disequilibrium). To achieve true democracy, efforts are needed to create a new balance between the government and people's representative institutions, by giving power to the DPD in the legislative process, as well as giving the DPD the authority to nominate candidates for President and Vice President.

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**Keywords:** *Dialectics of Democracy; Indonesian Democracy; New Balance; New Governance Order; Regional Representative Council*

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### INTRODUCTION

The Regional Representative Council (DPD) is one of the people's representative institutions in Indonesia which has an important role in the democratic system (Kurnia & Budiharto, 2015). As part of the people's representative institution, the DPD has the responsibility to articulate regional interests in the decision-making process at the national level (Setiawan, 2015).

Since its formation in 2004, the DPD has become the subject of heated debate in the dynamics of Indonesian politics (Aspinall, 2010). In this way, understanding of the role and function of the DPD in the context of Indonesian democracy will continue to develop. Indonesia has experienced a long

journey in building and strengthening a democratic system, especially since the 1998 reform (Kusuma, 2016).

This reform process brought significant changes in the country's political order and government system (Aspinall, 2005). One important reform product is the formation of the DPD as a regional representative institution at the national level (Panggabean, 2013). According to Toding, A (2017) DPD was formed with the aim of giving a voice to regions at the national level and ensuring that regional interests are considered in making national laws and policies.

Even though it has an important role, the DPD is often the object of criticism and controversy in the dynamics of Indonesian

politics (Sutiyono et al., 2018). Some parties consider that the DPD is ineffective in articulating regional interests and tends to become an "auxiliary institution" that only increases costs without providing meaningful benefits for the community (Huda, 2017).

Apart from that, there is also a debate regarding whether the DPD is necessary in the Indonesian political system, where several parties propose to abolish this institution and transfer its functions to other institutions (Oktaviany, 2017)

Empirical data shows that DPD performance is still not optimal. Based on observations and interviews with stakeholders, it was found that only 30% of DPD recommendations were adopted in national policy (Sinaga, 2023).

Analysis of official documents also shows that although the DPD budget continues to increase every year, there is no significant increase in legislative output (RI et al., 2014). Several previous studies have tried to provide solutions to increase the effectiveness of DPD. (Wardhani, 2019)proposed strengthening the DPD's legislative function through constitutional amendments.

(Toding, (2017) emphasized the importance of increasing the capacity of DPD members through intensive training. At the international level, shows that structural reforms and strengthening the role of supervision can increase the effectiveness of regional representative institutions.

The best thing about previous research is the clear identification of problems and concrete proposed solutions, such as constitutional amendments and increasing the capacity of DPD members. However, the main limitation of previous research is the lack of comprehensive analysis linking the role of the DPD with democratic dynamics at the local and national levels.

Apart from that, there are no studies that specifically examine how public perception and participation influence the effectiveness of the DPD. To overcome these limitations, this research will adopt a qualitative approach with descriptive analysis combining literature studies, conceptual analysis, case studies and document analysis.

This approach will enable a more holistic understanding of the role of the DPD in the context of Indonesian democracy. The novelty of this research lies in its multi-disciplinary approach which combines institutional analysis with the study of public perception and participation (Hariyanti & Sari, 2021).

This will provide a more comprehensive understanding of the role of the DPD in the context of Indonesia's growing democracy. Resolving this problem is very important considering the DPD's strategic position in the Indonesian democratic system. A better understanding of the role and functions of the DPD can contribute to improving the quality

of democracy and better governance in Indonesia (Nurchotimah, 2020).

The aim of this research is to comprehensively analyze the role and function of the DPD in the context of Indonesian democracy, with a particular focus on the effectiveness of this institution in articulating regional interests and its contribution to strengthening democracy in Indonesia.

## RESEARCH METHODS

This research uses a qualitative approach with descriptive analysis to explore an in-depth understanding of the role of the Regional Representative Council (DPD) in the dynamics of democracy in Indonesia. The methodological steps used in this research include:

First, through a literature study, this research is based on an extensive literature review on Indonesian political history, the constitution, the role of people's representative institutions, and democratic theories. Primary and secondary sources are used to gain a comprehensive understanding of the topic.

Second, through conceptual analysis, conceptual analysis is carried out to understand the role and function of the DPD in the context of democratic dynamics in Indonesia. Concepts such as checks and balances, separation of powers, and popular sovereignty are used as an analytical framework to evaluate the role of the DPD in the Indonesian political system.

Third, with case studies, several case studies regarding the role and performance of DPD in political decision making at the regional level can be used to support research findings. This case study analysis will provide deeper insight into the challenges and opportunities faced by the DPD in carrying out its functions.

Fourth, through document analysis, this is carried out on official documents such as laws, decisions and official reports relating to the DPD. Analysis of this document will provide information about the legal and policy framework that regulates the role and function of the DPD in the Indonesian political system.

By using this approach, this research aims to provide an in-depth understanding of the role of the DPD in the dynamics of democracy in Indonesia and identify the challenges and future prospects of this institution in strengthening the principles of inclusive and participatory democracy.

## RESULT

This research identifies that the role of the Regional Representative Council (DPD) in the dynamics of democracy in Indonesia experiences significant challenges in achieving balance with the government and other people's representative institutions such as the People's Representative Council (DPR).

Based on search analysis and analysis of various literature, 3 (three) main things were found:

### Development of a Government System

Based on the Polybios Cycle The Cyclus Polybios theory, developed by the ancient Greek historian Polybius, provides a conceptual framework for understanding the evolution of governmental systems (Polibius, 1889).

Based on this concept, the development of the government system can be described in four main phases:

Government Phases	Main Characteristics	Examples in Indonesia
Monarchy	Naturalistic supremacy	Pre-colonial kingdom era
Aristocracy	Government by nobility	Early independence period
Oligarchy	Domination by elites with capital and influence	New order era
Democracy	People's sovereignty through representative	Reform era

Table 1: Development of Government Systems Based on the Polybios Cycle

a) Monarchy, this government is based on naturalistic supremacy, where a single leader holds power, absolute in the view of Thomas Hobbes and constitutional according to John Locke. Francis Fukuyama explains that this phase of monarchy is often considered the most primitive form of government (Fukuyama, 2011). Even though this government is not actually always bad, because power is held by just one person, where he can be tempted to abuse it, this monarchy can

experience decay or decline in quality so that it becomes tyrannical.

- b) Aristocracy, this government is run by a group of people, usually by the nobility who are starting to become institutionalized. Aristotle in his book entitled "Politics" is of the view that in this phase, power is shared among a group of elites who usually come from noble or military families (Aristoteles, 1995).
- c) Oligarchy, this government is similar to aristocracy in that it is run by a group of people, the difference is that this government is run by an elite group who have capital and domination. Jeffry Winters said that this phase is characterized by the concentration of power in the hands of a few individuals or groups who have significant wealth and influence within the country (Winters, 2011).
- d) Democracy, this system according to Robert A. Dahl is a government where power and sovereignty are in the hands of the people, usually carried out through representative institutions (Dahl & Staehelin, 1989). This government is considered the most advanced form of government, although it also has challenges.

Although the Cyclus Polybios theory has been criticized for oversimplifying complex political processes, according to Held this theory is still important because it provides

a useful framework for analyzing changes in government systems (Held, 2006).

This theory is considered to offer a unique perspective on how government systems develop and change over time. This theory provides a conceptual basis for understanding power dynamics in society. Held argues that although political reality is often more complicated than Polybios depicts, the framework remains relevant as an analytical tool in modern political science.

Criticism of Polybios' Cyclus theory has largely focused on its deterministic and linear nature. Some political scientists, such as (Dahl, 1989), stated that the development of government systems does not always follow a rigid pattern as described by Polybios. They argue that factors such as economic conditions, technology, and international influences also play an important role in shaping a country's political system.

However, Held emphasized that despite its limitations, the theory still has value in providing a basic framework for understanding long-term political change. Furthermore, Fukuyama (2011) develops Held's argument by stating that the Cyclus Polybios theory can be seen as a starting point for a deeper analysis of the evolution of political institutions.

He suggests that rather than viewing it as a rigid model, the theory can be used as a lens to examine how and why government systems change over time. In this way,

Polybios's Cyclus theory remains a valuable tool in the study of comparative politics and political history, providing a conceptual framework that can be adapted and expanded to understand the complexity of political development across different contexts and historical periods.

### **Evaluation of Indonesian Political**

Dynamics Since independence until the reform era, Indonesia experienced various phases of government characterized by an imbalance between the government and people's representative institutions:

- a) 1945-1959: Herbert Feith revealed that in this era Indonesian democracy adopted a parliamentary democracy system with the dominance of political parties. This period was characterized by political instability and frequent cabinet changes (Feith, 2007).
- b) 1959-1965: Guided democracy dominated by President Soekarno. This phase is characterized by an increase in executive power and a reduction in the role of political parties (Lev, 2009).
- c) 1965-1998: Pancasila Democracy under the New Order with the dominance of Golkar, ABRI and the bureaucracy. This period was characterized by political stability but also repression of the opposition (Aspinall, 2010).
- d) 1998-present: according to Markus Mietzner, the reform era is an era of transition towards a purer democracy, but



it is also acknowledged that it still faces the challenge of an imbalance of power. This period was characterized by decentralization of power and increased political participation in society (Mietzner, 2013).

Period	Main Characteristics	Condition of Democracy	Main Issues
1945-1959	Parliamentary Democracy	Anarchy	Cabinet instability
1959-1965	Guided Democracy	Tyranny	Greget power of the president
1965-1998	New Order	Tyranny	Dominance of Golkar and oligar

Tabel 2: Table of Democracy Balance

The dynamics above reflect Indonesia's journey in seeking a balance between political stability and democratic representation (Crouch, 2010). However, this search for balance does not always go smoothly. As stated by (Aspinall and Mietzner, 2010) above, Indonesia often faces a dilemma between maintaining political stability and expanding democratic space.

On the one hand, there is a need to maintain stability to support economic development and social welfare. On the other hand, demands for broader representation and more meaningful participation in the political process continue to increase.

### Role and Challenges of DPD

The Regional Representative Council (DPD), as one of the people's representative

institutions formed after reform, is expected to be a balance in the Indonesian political system.

However, there are several challenges faced:

- a) Imbalance of Power. The DPD is often considered less powerful than the DPR, especially in terms of legislative authority (S. Sherlock, 2010).
- b) Oligarchy Influence. The dominance of political and economic elites still influences public policy, which can threaten the independence of the DPD (Hadiz & Robison, 2004).
- c) Role in Legislation. The limited role of the DPD in the legislative process limits its effectiveness in representing regional interests (Hanan, 2012a).

According to Denny Indrayana, these challenges indicate the need for further reform to strengthen the role of the DPD in the Indonesian political system (Indrayana, 2008).

Indrayana believes that the current limited authority of the DPD is not in line with the initial spirit of establishing this institution as regional representation at the national level. He highlighted that the DPD should have a more substantial role in the legislative process, especially with regard to regional autonomy and central-regional relations.

Furthermore, Indrayana emphasized the importance of constitutional amendments to strengthen the DPD's position. He proposed that the DPD be given equal authority to the DPR in terms of legislation, especially for laws that are directly related to regional interests.

Apart from that, Indrayana also suggested that the DPD be given veto rights in the process of making certain laws, so that it can be more effective in fighting for regional interests.

However, Indrayana also reminded that institutional reform alone is not enough. He emphasized the importance of increasing the capacity of DPD members and their supporting staff, as well as the need to build closer relationships between the DPD and constituents in the regions.

According to Indrayana, only with a combination of institutional reform and capacity building, can the DPD truly become an effective institution in strengthening democracy and balancing central and regional interests in the Indonesian political system.

## DISCUSSION

### Dialectics Democracy

This article departs from problems with democracy as one of the form social reconstructions of reality form government in a country, where until the 1990s the number countries that adhere to democracy experienced a significant increase from 76 countries or 46.1% to 117 countries or 63.1% (McDonald, 2015).

Based on the concept of *Cyclus* Polybios, as expressed by (McGing, (2010), namely a cycle of government map phases government through four (4) stages, namely monarchy order, aristocracy order, oligarchy order, and democratic order.

In the first order, monarchy is order government which is based on naturalistic supremacy. In government of this kind according to (Orr, DA 2002), which is more numerous in control It is not a social order that is based on social consensus, but the naturalistic authority of certain people in a society. The problem is naturalistic supremacy is nothing other than the physical and magical powers attached to certain people which are inherited from nature.

In a society like this, it is very possible for a patterned life to emerge "homo homini lupus" (a group of humans is a group of wolves that prey on other groups of humans), as imagined by Thomas Hobbes in his work entitled *Leviatan*. This kind of tribalistic social life makes naturalistic supremacy the only "tool" to measure the legitimacy of power.

Apart from these kinds of primitive patterns of life, natural society also relies heavily on myth (Buxton, 2013). Natural signs in the life of modern society can be explained using a scientific approach, by natural society they are considered as indications of certain events. Ancient Greek society, with all its forms of belief in gods and "masters of nature" is an example of a natural community life pattern.

This natural community life also reminds us of the life patterns of prehistoric communities, where humans never had a place to live (nomadic), moving from one place to another to areas where there was a lot of food,

therefore they got food by way of collecting food (gabhering) and not yet familiar with more sophisticated ways to maintain life.

In this kind of society, the pattern of social relations carried out does not depend on mutually agreed mechanisms but is based on the will of the tribal rulers. With the example of Arab society, it can be said that the form of social respect for humans is not based on achievement but rather on prestige (prestige).

It is conceivable that the social order desired in natural society cannot be achieved. When the goal of creating a social order is not achieved, people then move on to a social order which is more civilized and orderly, then what is called 'political society' emerges.

In the second order, aristocracy is order government which is based on the strong influence of the nobility is considered to be a representative group of society that has a strong influence after the king.

This group of people felt dissatisfied with the king's increasingly tyrannical actions, the culmination of which was the overthrow of the king's power. If deep monarchical government, power Not yet ever organized and institutionalized, then in aristocracy government, this power began to be institutionalized in an organization which was then referred to as aristocratic form of government.

At first, aristocratic government was formed as an effort to overcome the use of superiority king as a means of organizing

society. But instead of solving social chaos, government in carrying out what is considered a solution to overcome the possibility of its occurrence social disorders that actually gives rise to it social disorders new that was brought about by none other than king Alone.

Why government cause social disorder? Because to be able to overcome various kinds of naturalistic superiority the government acts tyrannically, in order to achieve absolute social order. Law is What what is said or ordered by the king, so that what the king does must be considered never wrong (the king can do no wrong).

Over time, the government controlled by the nobility (aristocracy) eventually experienced intense competition among the nobles themselves, they even tended to put each other down. Instead of wanting to create social order in society, what happens is instead a new social disorder. In the third order, oligarchy is forming government which is results lawsuit aristocratic government, which was originally intended to overcome the king's tyranny, in fact, ultimately created a new tyranny of the noble elite. So that efforts that were originally hoped to be able to bring about a new social order or order, in the end experienced a reverse flow which invites dissatisfaction from small groups or elites who have power, both capital and influence (domination).



As time goes by, the role of the elite who own capital and dominate increasingly expands and controls the lives of many people, ultimately displacing or overthrowing the government of the aristocracy. So the oligarchic government began to replace aristocratic rule.

In the beginning, oligarchic government was functional in controlling social order in society, because government can be controlled by person only certain (relatively few), rather than the control of the nobility which of course much more Lots and varied in society.

The oligarchy emerges to control the government because the person concerned owns it capital support Which can exchanged for special rights (privelege). This is the seed or seed of weakness in the oligarchic government system, where the person concerned does not have sufficient skills in government even if they have sufficient capital.

Over time, governments controlled by certain groups of people in oligarchic governments ultimately experience conditions where many policies are not based on or oriented the interests of the people, but rather due to the considerations of a group of elites/oligarchs, ultimately giving rise to lawsuits from the people themselves.

It is inevitable that chaos among society will also result in the emergence of widespread lawsuits from society against the

government, which in turn gave birth to a democratic government.

In the fourth order, democracy is forming government where state affairs, power and sovereignty of the people are then represented through people's representative institutions. The aim of democratic government is to limit the power of the ruler (government), on the other hand it is to provide freedom of opinion and expression for the people.

Democracy is a form of superior institutional lawsuit oligarchy which was originally intended to overcome supremacy aristocracy which is centered on the will of the nobility in controlling the government.

Initially, oligarchic government was functional in controlling social order in society, because government could be controlled by only certain people (relatively little), rather than the control of the nobility, which of course was much more numerous and diverse in society.

Over time, it turns out oligarchs too experiencing backflow in the form of more and more policies that only favor certain groups of people, and do not favor the majority of people. Finally, a mass movement arose to overthrow the oligarchic government.

Democracy very prominent nowadays became a topic of conversation when the fall of the Berlin Wall which marked the disappearance of the East

German map and its fusion into a unified Germany. It turns out that the fall of the Berlin Wall had a domino effect on collapse of the communist regime.

One by one, countries in Eastern Europe, Latin America and Asia went bankrupt and often these countries were torn apart into several sovereign states. As experienced by the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia—the countries which together with Indonesia were the pioneers and promoters of the Asian-African Conference in 1955.

### **House of Representatives Region: a Antithesis**

The reforms that occurred in 1988 marked this that new chapter Now Indonesia is in a phase transition going to democracy towards more true (genuine), is a complex and long process at the moment Indonesia's economy has not encouraging.

In business build democracy in its early days reform has done policies in three (3) areas big. First, reform system implemented with amending the 1945 Constitution which resulted amendment first (1999), second 2000, third in 2001, and fourth in 2002. Second, reform relevant institutions / institutions development and empowerment institution politics. And third, development more political culture democratic (Azra, 2002).

On point first and second effort reform carried out in the legislative, executive and judicial domains. Whereas For points third

more development oriented culture political democratic, primarily through a targeted educational process segment public starting from the elite until people layman.

As effort more carry-on reform institutional politics, especially institutions representative people so done amendments to the 1945 Constitution in Chapter VIIA articles 22C and 22D (results amendment third in 2001). On basic law here it is then Indonesia adheres to it two institution representative the people, namely the DPR which is representative representative selected people through election general past track party politics. Temporary that DPD is representative the chosen people through election general represent people area province.

On base here it has then appeared two (2) institutions representative the people in the 1945 Constitution results amendment. First, the House of Representatives People (DPR) as representative representative elected people past party politics. Second, the House of Representatives Area as representative people represent area provinces, which then (DPR and DPD) are members of the MPR (article 2 paragraph 1 of the 1945 Constitution) as the embodiment of sovereignty in hand people.

Dynamics political something country democracy very depending on the relationship social between government with institution representative people moment that. There's a moment Where role government assessed too dominant to institution representative people,

temporary position institution representative people so weak government, then condition country the is in the category of " tyranny ". If something the country is in position thereby actually country the No is in condition genuine democracy or no pure.

Vice versa if role institution representative people too dominant in the relationship social with government, then condition country the is in the " anarchy " category. This means that Good tyrannical nor anarchy both of them including country Democracy is not ideal, there are indeed changes in conditions tyrannical to anarchy ( and vice versa ) but what actually happened is change of conditions democracy not a normal one to condition next abnormal . This is what is depicted by (Efendi, 2002) as society is in disequilibrium, though essence reform is change going to balance new society or equilibrium .

Next, if the pattern thinks this is used for describe development democracy in Indonesia after independence until now, then quick obtained description installs receding. The crucial problem facing the Indonesian nation is How democracy practiced by institution politics, elite political until public layman. Sketch development democracy in Indonesia line big mapped on:

#### 1. Democracy Between 1945 to 1959

Lots the party providing connotation democracy parliamentary. ongoing democracy a month after enactment the later 1945 law

apparently strengthened the 1950 Constitution find problems in matters fall the establishment of a government (cabinet) as a result weak mark democracy on democracy later parliament bring up domination party politics and council representative people, moreover, Constitution base 1950 with firm declares the president as head of state and prime minister minister as head of government.

Segregation party political so strong resulting in cabinet age No Can last a long time, on the other hand the coalition is built between party easy that crack at the end cause political instability national. Other factors that cause instability political Because exists strength social and political ones that are not get a real place in the constellation politics.

Other factors are not lost his role is body Constituent Assembly No Once reach consensus in determining Constitution new basis, which is then encouraged President Soekarno For emit presidential decree of 5 July 1959 for return to Constitution Foundation 1945.

#### 2. Democracy between 1959 to 1965

The most dominant characteristic of democracy this period is the strong will of the president in government and its weakening role party politics, in time simultaneously influence Communist widespread and ABRI's role is like that felt strong as make it happen strength social politics. The momentum of the Presidential Decree of July 5, 1959, is point

reject solution to the dead end political as choice form a strong government.

Constitution Basic 1945 no arrange with strict period limits the office of president, as its derivatives there is MPRS Decree Number 3 of 1963 which appointed Soekarno as president lifetime life. This is cancellation restrictions presidential term that should be every 5 years very done election general. and still Lots Again abuses that occur during democracy guided.

### 3. Democracy between 1965 to 1998

Determination strong government The New Order is implement Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution in an effective manner pure and consistent, that's what why democracy is known with Pancasila democracy. A number of product laws made during Democracy Lead corrected for organized and adjusted with enthusiasm and determination return to the 1945 Constitution.

At the same time, the role group works, and ABRI played role key in supporting the new order government so that election general The first held during the New Order era in 1971 was won by group supported work full by ABRI and bureaucrats (PNS).

At first the New Order government took place functional in operation maintenance country so that bring the nation and state toward stability more politics Good If compared to the old order period. Along with walking time added with the length of time the

president is in office office (five elections bring up Golkar as winner).

At this time the MPR as executor sovereignty the people (article 1 paragraph 2 of the 1945 Constitution before amended) dominated by Golkar, ABRI and bureaucrats Then choose Suharto Became President 32 years powerful.

Condition thereby brings up anxiety that has an impact on existence crisis politics that peaked in 1998 which resulted wave sweeping reforms all over the country and tailed off fall regime The new order.


### 4. Period 1998 to now

Since reforms from 1998 to now Indonesia is entering transition democracy going to genuine democracy. This phase is period important at a time critical because it will determine direction desired democracy by the Indonesian people. On the other hand, this phase is also worrying can give rise to current come back led Indonesia to enter new authoritarianism as happened in the old order and the new order.

Fail nor success transition democracy something country very depends on 4 things, namely: 1) Components elite politics 2) Design institution politics, 3) culture politics, 4) the role of civil society (Azra, A. 2002). Of the four key factors involved with theme this article is the second factor that is design institution politics, specially design institution representative people (MPR, DPR, DPD). remember third institution political the is

implementation principal sovereignty people, to direction How sovereignty people designed in the democracy in Indonesia.

If pay close attention history journey country democracy in the world get it stated that the more succeed regime / ruler provide desire people, will increase rooted strong confidence people to legitimacy democracy (Rosyada & Tim, 2003). As visualization development democracy in Indonesia follows given the illustration.



During the reign of the Old Order practice liberal and guided democracy both of them is condition order non - ideal democracy (disequilibrium) in two forms namely anarchy and tyranny.

Furthermore, during the New Order government that took place practice Pancasila democracy, in the beginning show positive spirit return to the purity of Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. However along with forever regime power, seed seeds domination government (Golkar, ABRI, Bureaucracy), added widespread oligarchy mastery politics

and economics make practice democracy return inclined to direction tyranny.

Entering the era of reform especially at the beginning reform condition practice democracy tend strength gain the momentum of freedom emit opinion, the previous one not enough over 32 years confined. Almost every moment a demo appears by element society, so practice democracy tends to direction anarchy.

Through constitutional change of government past election general periodic every five years very start in 1999, 2004, 2009, 2014, and 2019 stability political start obtain the shape. However sadly precisely now strength government plus votes parliament (DPR) is controlled by supporter government, cause practice of democratic life is in condition tyranny.

Questions that arise is Why the practice of democratic life in Indonesia is moving away from tyranny to anarchy, or the opposite of anarchy going to tyranny. Like a wall clock ticking from left (anarchy) to right (tyranny), and vice versa from tyranny going to anarchy. There is a change in conditions one (anarchy) to condition next (tyranny), but both of them refers to conditions that are not balanced (disequilibrium). It means both of them dangerous for continuity democracy, which requires consensus and balance.

Ideal and expected conditions actually is exists equality or balance between element government and people which are manifested in institutions representatives, namely the DPR



and DPD are the same strong. This is what is called as new balance (equilibrium) genuine democracy.

According to economical writer reason no marked ideal by instability relation social between government and institutions representative the people's (DPR) motive are: First, considerations more politics put forward aspect win-lose in taking definite decision just more tending to the interests of political parties-oligarchs- individuals, which is lacking ignore national interests whole. Second, implementation formulation "one man one vote" in a election the general public is looking everyone has the same rights assessed paradox with principle justice although constitutional.

On base here it is required new balance in relationships social politics between government with institution representative people, so that the process leads to practice genuine democracy is possible realized. As A effort concrete towards ideal government. Entrust fully will people assessed to the DPR No fully correct, considering there are calculations politics from political parties' bearer. By him felt urge for empowering institution DPD countries use voice interests of the nation and state more main, rather than stuck in calculations period short (win-lose), which is more accommodate interest groups-political parties - oligarchs-individuals.

Recommendations given through this article is give strengthening to the DPD in carrying out function Legislation (agreeing or

reject the bill), at once do proposal amendment to article 6A paragraph 2 and include the DPD as proposer candidates for President and Vice President, besides proposed by party political or combined party politics. If this is possible Approved hope realize an ideal democracy can done, useful bring the nation and state to direction of civilized democratic government.

### **Role and Challenges of DPD**

The challenges faced by the Regional Representative Council (DPD) in Indonesia highlight the complex nature of institutional development in emerging democracies. A comparative analysis with various scholarly articles reveals several key points of discussion:

#### **1. Institutional Design and Power Balance**

The imbalance of power between the DPD and DPR reflects a broader issue in institutional design. (Kawamura, 2010) argues that the limited authority of the DPD is a result of intentional design during constitutional amendments, aimed at preventing potential regional separatism. This perspective adds depth to (C. Sherlock et al., 2010) observation of the DPD's limited legislative authority.

In contrast, (Lijphart, 2012) work on consociational democracy suggests that a more balanced bicameral system could better accommodate Indonesia's diverse regional interests. This aligns with (Indrayana, 2008b) proposal for strengthening the DPD's role.

## 2. Oligarchic Influence and Democratic Consolidation

The challenge of oligarchic influence noted by (Hadiz and Robison (2004) is not unique to Indonesia. Winters (2011) provides a comparative framework, demonstrating how oligarchies adapt to and coexist with democratic institutions across different political systems. This suggests that the DPD's challenges are part of a broader pattern in democratizing nations.

(Aspinal, 2013) further argues that Indonesia's oligarchic democracy represents a specific form of democratic consolidation, where elite interests are accommodated within democratic structures. This perspective offers a nuanced view of the DPD's role in balancing regional and national interests.

## 3. Legislative Role and Regional Representation

Hanan (2012) observation on the DPD's limited legislative role can be contextualized within broader debates on bicameralism in presidential systems. (Stepan and Skach, 1993) argue that strong bicameralism can enhance democratic stability in presidential systems, supporting Indrayana's call for expanding the DPD's legislative authority.

Boix (2021) cautions that institutional reforms must be carefully calibrated to avoid gridlock, especially in diverse societies like Indonesia. This suggests that any expansion of the DPD's powers should be balanced against the need for effective governance.

## 4. Capacity Building and Institutional Effectiveness

Indrayana's emphasis on capacity building aligns with broader literature on institutional development. (Fukuyama, 2013) argues that the effectiveness of political institutions depends not just on formal rules, but on the quality of personnel and organizational culture. This supports Indrayana's call for enhancing the capacity of DPD members and staff.

(Putnam, 1993) work on social capital and institutional performance suggests that building closer relationships between the DPD and regional constituents could enhance its effectiveness and legitimacy.

## 5. Constitutional Reform and Democratic Deepening

The proposal for constitutional amendments to strengthen the DPD's position reflects ongoing debates about democratic deepening in Indonesia. (Horowitz, 2014) argues that incremental constitutional reform can be more effective than wholesale changes in consolidating democracies. This perspective suggests that a gradual approach to enhancing the DPD's role might be more feasible and effective.

In this sense, the challenges faced by the DPD in Indonesia reflect broader issues of institutional design, democratic consolidation, and the balance between national unity and regional representation. The comparative

analysis reveals that while these challenges are significant, they are not unique to Indonesia.

The path forward likely involves a careful balance of institutional reform, capacity building, and the cultivation of stronger ties between the DPD and its constituents. This multifaceted approach, as suggested by Indrayana and supported by comparative literature, offers the best prospect for enhancing the DPD's role in Indonesia's evolving democratic system.

## CONCLUSION

The Regional Representative Council (DPD) in Indonesia plays a vital role in the dynamics of democracy, especially in the context of its relationship with other people's representative institutions, such as the People's Representative Council (DPR). Since the 1998 reforms, Indonesia has experienced significant changes in efforts to build a truer democracy. Nevertheless, challenges and problems in democratic practice remain, especially related to the balance between the government and people's representative institutions. Through the history of Indonesian democracy, it can be seen that the practice of democracy has experienced significant ups and downs. From the Old Order era to the New Order, and then towards the reform era, the pattern of change in democratic practice was reflected from conditions of tyranny to anarchy, and vice versa. However, both are conditions that are not ideal and unbalanced (*disequilibrium*). To achieve genuine democracy, efforts are needed

to create a new balance between the government and people's representative institutions. This can be done by strengthening the role of the DPD in the legislative process, including giving the DPD the power to approve or reject bills, as well as giving the DPD the authority to nominate candidates for President and Vice President, apart from political parties or coalitions of political parties.

This recommendation aims to restore people's sovereignty in democratic practice, reduce the dominance of the interests of certain groups, and encourage the realization of a more democratic and civilized government. Thus, it is hoped that these steps can take Indonesia towards a better direction in building an inclusive and participatory democracy.

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