

The Pancasila Guidelines Bill and Ideological Contestation in Indonesia

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Abstract

This discursive article based on secondary sources attempts a discourse analysis of a recently proposed legislation in Indonesia to delineate the contours of ideological contestation between the proponents of the Statist Ideology of Pancasila, and the revival of challenges to it from religious radicalism. By tracing the history of the confrontation between contending ideological conceptions of the Indonesian State, and contextualizing it, through the sociological jurisprudential approach, to the recently proposed, and subsequently postponed, Pancasila Guidelines Bill, 2020, an attempt has been made to decipher the undercurrents of the struggle for sociopolitical hegemony that drive the imperatives in Indonesian polity. The implicit negotiation of interests between the Statist political elites, the civil nationalist religious clergy and the couched praetorian military about the relevance and status of Pancasila as the State Ideology of Indonesia, as outlined in the proposed statute, is taken to be reflective of the challenges confronting, and choices available to the future direction of democracy and inclusivity in Indonesia in the face of growing religious radicalism threatening democratic stability.

Keywords: *Ideological Contestation; Religious Radicalism; Pancasila; Indonesia; Military*

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INTRODUCTION

Pancasila, the national ideology of Indonesia is acknowledged as the collection of foundational normative principles embodying the determinative values of the culture of Indonesia (Pinasang, 2012). Legally, the Principles of Pancasila are expressed in the “unamendable” preamble of the Constitution of Indonesia, 1945 and expected to be the guiding principles of the democratic Indonesian Republic (Eddyono, 2017). On 12 May 2020, the Pancasila Guidelines Bill, 2020 (*RUU HIP, Haluan Ideologi Pancasila*) a proposed statute to regulate the implementation of Indonesian State Ideology of Pancasila was introduced in the Parliament of Indonesia (Fadhilillah & Yusuf, 2021). While the Government of President Widodo and the ruling Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) lobbied strongly for it to be enacted into law, a coalition of political Islamist groups thwarted his efforts by organising a massive public demonstration outside the Parliament, even during the Covid 19 lockdown, as a show of unified opposition to the proposed Bill (Fadhilillah & Yusuf, 2021). The faceoff between the Statist Political Executive favouring the Bill and the popular Islamists opposing it, even as the Armed soldiers of the Indonesian Military stood guard around the Parliament signifies an analogy of the ideologically conflictual political situation in Indonesia, which this article seeks to explore.

Indonesia, an archipelagic State with ethnic, cultural, religious, and linguistic diversity is the world’s largest Muslim country with more than 88 percent of its population being adherents of Islam (Lubis, 2020) and religion plays a crucial, if not central role, in determining the contours of Indonesian electoral politics (Tanuwidjaja, 2010). It is crucial to emphasise here the distinction between

Islam, the universally egalitarian faith, and the politics that can instrumentalise any religious faith for achievement of political objectives (Panjaitan, 2020). This article focuses on “Islamism” as a political ideology and not on “Islam” the faith. Islamism as a political ideology can be democratic as in the case of the Statist nationalist Indonesian groups which comprise of fundamentalist followers of the Islamic faith, who are inclusive in their ideological vision. Or it can be violently exclusive and dismissive of democratic republicanism as in the case of radical Islamist groups in Indonesia (Damayanti, Thayibi, Gardhiani, & Limy, 2003). The demographic fact of religious composition has been the source of ideological contestation, since the Independence of Indonesia in 1945, between the radical Islamists vision of Indonesia as an Islamic State and the Nationalist ideological commitment of the Statist Nationalists and Civil Islamists to maintaining the pluralism under the national motto of “*Bhinneka Tunggal Ika*” (Unity in Diversity).

Moreover, the military of Indonesia is an important political actor and its interests and tutelary nationalist conceptions of the State influence political developments. The military as a political actor has its own interpretation of the principles of the Pancasila, as a tool for its own political hegemony, which was reflected in the politics of the New Order Era (Morfit, 1981). The interaction inter-se of these political players and their ideologies to influence the legal arena and the content of law is an under-researched area sought to be addressed in this article.

RESEARCH METHODS

This discursive article seeks to analyse and comprehend the political manoeuvring behind the Pancasila Guidelines Bill, 2020 as an indicator of the deep-seated socio-political conflicts between the ideologies in Indonesia which is a

novel approach to gain a scientific and theoretical grasp on the complex politics of Indonesia.

The Research Methodology followed in this discursive research article is through a socially constructivist, inductive, and post-positivist discourse analysis of extant literature followed by subsequent dialectical comprehension (Farrelly, 2010). It draws upon sociological jurisprudence as the qualitative analytical framework for scrutiny of the public discourses surrounding the Pancasila Guidelines Bill, 2020.

Sociological jurisprudence is normative in orientation and views laws as Statist coercive instrument for social engineering which is reflective of the prevalent values and dominant norms of society. The Laws enacted through the legislative process and legal judicial structure are considered to be socio-politically determined, to address specific issues for influencing public opinion, transforming the political power dynamics and reconfiguring social relations within the civil society and the State (Matnuh, 2018). With this socially Constructivist orientation of analysis of the proposed legal structure for the implementation of the Pancasila in Indonesia, the political debates and rhetoric about the provisions of the proposed statute, as reported in the media, have been relied upon for drawing inferences about the ideological contestations among the various political actors in Indonesian polity, for the transition of power, and its implications on the democratic structure and inclusivity of society of Indonesia.

This article hypothesises that the legal arena, as the legitimate source of the State's coercive power, has emerged as a crucial battleground of ideological confrontation between the dominant actors of Indonesian politics, and that the future directions of Indonesian democracy will be largely determined through the interactions between the Statist Nationalists,

the radical Islamists, and the praetorian military of Indonesia through domination of the process of legislation of statutes.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Pancasila as a Foundation

Pancasila is the inclusive National Ideology of Indonesia which has been credited by scholars as the binding force that keeps the extremely diverse State united and vigorously democratic (Darmaputera, 1988), even as most other Muslim majority States in the world have moved away from democracy towards authoritarianism (Liddle & Mujani, 2013). Its values represent the ancient, endemic, normative, socio-culturally inherent expression of the political and economic aspirations of the citizens of Indonesian which emerged as the "*volkgeist*" of nationalism based on "Unity in Diversity", during Indonesia's struggle against Dutch Colonial rule (Tolib, 2008).

This spirit of recognising and celebrating pluri-nationalism and myriad intersectional diversities within the Indonesian State, enshrined in the national motto "*Bhineka Tunggal Ika*" is the objective of the Pancasila Ideology which is enshrined as a guiding principle in the preamble of the Constitution of Indonesia for all laws enacted, and policies implemented (Dimiyati et al., 2021; Notonagoro, 1971).

The centrality of the Pancasila has been reiterated by all regimes despite their internal political differences and the Parliamentary Statute (*Mahkamah Konstitusi Nomor 100/PUU-IX/2013*) asserted by law that the preeminent role of Pancasila as the ideological foundation of the Indonesia cannot be eliminated without legal dissolution of the Republic itself (Manan, 2014). The fact that a monolithic Statist interpretation of the Pancasila ideology had never been officially implemented, meant that all partisans could claim allegiance to the

spirit of the Pancasila while debating the content and meaning of the core values while affording identification with Pancasila Ideology (Faisal, 2018).

Despite this repeated assertion of the supremacy of the Pancasila, the ideology has always faced intermittent challenges from other contesting ideologies and divergent interpretations. The initial contestation against the Pancasila came from the Civil Islamists (Hefner Robert, 2000) on the eve of Independence leading to negotiations with the Nationalists which was negotiated through the Jakarta Charter (Mu'ti & Burhani, 2019). The support of the Civil Islamists (the non-political civil society religious Islamic movements of *Muhammadiyah* and *Nahdlatul Ulama*) for the Pancasila (Rofiq, 2018), and their commitment to balanced and progressive interpretation of Islam focussed on healthcare, social welfare, education, gender equality, civil activism and egalitarianism has contributed to Unity of the Indonesian State and religious tolerance, due to the moderation and teaching imparted at the educational institutions of the Civil Islamists (Zulian, 2018). The contribution of the Civil Islamists has been widely acknowledged as the crucial political factor that has aided the democratisation, and ensured the survival of democracy in Indonesia (Künkler & Stepan, 2013; Lussier & Fish, 2012).

Challenges to the Pancasila

More recently a growing challenge to the Pancasila and its implementation and the democratic traditions nurtured by Civil Islam has emerged from radical Islamist ideology which is ascendant in Indonesian Politics (Amir, 2013). This radical Islamist ideological challenge is largely pivoted around the first principle of the Pancasila mandating monotheistic faith, which is variously interpreted by the adherents of the different political ideologies as a basis for the legal superstructure (Hasan, Supanto, &

Soehartono, 2019). While for the majority of the Civil Islamists it represents Islamic monotheism and tolerance for other minority faiths, within a nation united by its identity as a nation as envisaged in the Constitution of Indonesia (Gellert, 2015), the recent and more revanchist radical Islamist interpretations view the freedom and protection to other faiths as implemented by the policies of the Government of Indonesia as a betrayal of their vision of Indonesia as an Islamic State (Suryadinata, 2018). It is to be noted here that Article 29 of the Constitution of Indonesia, which is based on the Pancasila Ideology, while recognising six different religions, prohibits any one religion from being declared the national religion of the Republic (Latif, 2018).

An apposite instance of the ideological orientation of the revanchist radical Islamists can be drawn from the political philosophy of the *Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia* (HTI) which has been legally proscribed in Indonesia (Saifuddin, 2012). Subscribing to a radical Pan-Islamic revanchism that seeks the reestablishment of a utopian universal Islamic political state of the *Khilafah* (Taufik, 2018), and the dissolution of all political Nation States including Indonesia, the HTI considers it to be a religiously mandated duty to fight for a universal Caliphate. It interprets the *Syariah* as the divine replacement for Statist Legislative Statutes, while condemning the moderate Civil Islamists as fallacious Muslims (Mulyadi, 2019). The tolerant, and peaceful practise of "Islam Nusantara" faith endemic to Indonesia and represented by Civil Islamists (Burhani, 2018), who support inclusive Indonesian nationalism has been eroded under the growing influence of radical Islamists. The support of the Civil Islamists for the Statist Nationalist political elites in power, has waned their influence, as the politicians are perceived as corrupt, nepotistic, and selfish. The

Civil Islamists and their social activism provide a bulwark against the radicalisation of Islam and erosion of democracy in Indonesia (Hefner, 2019).

Despite the proscription of revanchist ideologies, there has been a rise in the popularity of religious radicalism in Indonesia which is beset with the problems of integrating with the global economy resulting in socioeconomic inequality, corruption, nepotism, and a general disillusionment with democracy vis a vis the reductionist and practically untenable but emotive and attractive promises of divinely sanctioned political utopia that pan-Islamic revanchism offers (Van Bruinessen, 2013). Easy access to radical literature and videos in the cyberspace (Parawansa & Koesrianti, 2019), the economic slowdown due to Covid-19, and consequent rise in unemployment among educated youth in Indonesia has engendered disaffection against the Statist politicians and allowed the radical Islamists to challenge the legitimacy of the Government of Indonesia as “*pemerintahan jahiliah*” (Chalmers, 2017), while presenting a political utopian alternative that convolutes Islamic faith and promotes a distorted radical discourse of Jihad.

The politicisation and rise of revanchist radical Islam as a competing ideology rather than a religious movement has been perceived as a challenge, in the democratic process as well as to the continued existence of Indonesia as a political State, by the largely westernised, Statist Nationalists who are the ruling political elites of Indonesia. These Statist Nationalists are the ones who have repeatedly voiced their political concerns over increasing radicalisation and intolerance in religious education (*majelis taklim*) at mosques (Sajarah & Mahmudah, 2018). While presently democracy seems well established in Indonesia (Aspinall, 2015), it is still vulnerable to disruption or displacement and takeover by radical

religious forces. On the other hand, the possibility of authoritarian coups by the anti-radical but praetorian military (Aspinall, 2015), also constitutes a threat to the “democratic” hold on power by the Statist Nationalists, in case political stability deteriorates on account of rise of violent religious extremism. It is in the light of these political developments that the decision of the Widodo Government to introduce the Pancasila Guidance Bill, 2020 must be assessed.

The Motivations behind the Bill

The move by the ruling PDI-P Government to introduce the Pancasila Guidelines Bill, 2020, which has sixty articles in ten chapters, in the Parliament for legislative deliberation appears to be *prima facie* legally unassailable exercise of sovereign executive authority by the elected Government, as there is presently no statute to regulate the interpretation and implementation of the Pancasila Ideology. While there are some statutes (MPRS Decree No, XX/MPRS/1966, MPR Decree No. IX/1978 and MPR Decree No. III/2000) which regulate the implementation of the Pancasila, there is no Statutory guideline as to its interpretation and on 12 May 2020 the Bill was proposed by the ruling PDI-P party and admitted for legislative deliberation. The purported objective of the proposed Bill seems to be an attempt to reinvigorate the Statist interpretation of the Pancasila as the core socio-philosophical, ethico-moral, and politico-ideological foundation of Indonesia and restrict and pre-empt the rise of radical Pan-Islamism as a politico-religious Ideology.

However, the *naskah akademik* that elaborated the purpose of the proposed Bill as mediating “national development... based on the Pancasila values” at the federal, provincial, and sub-provincial levels, vested the powers of interpreting the same exclusively with the

Government of Indonesia, undermining decades of the process of democratic decentralisation of authority. This renewed assertion of power centralisation has been viewed with suspicion, even by those political actors who are critical of the Radical Islamists. The instrumentalization of Pancasila as an ideological tool for political styming of the Communists by the Soekarno's regime of Guided Democracy during the Old Order and its deployment for authoritarian excesses against political opponents under the *Manipol USDEK* under Soeharto's regime during the New Order era lend credence to these apprehensions of misuse of the exclusive authority of interpretation of Pancasila.

The increased recognition and approval of sub-national identities as a part of the democratic decentralisation and non-hierarchical acknowledgement of the equality of cultural and civilisational distinctiveness during the *reformasi* period also conflicts with the Jakarta based centralised interpretation of the Pancasila as envisaged by the proposed Bill, since indigenous human rights advocates, and cultural activists of the peripheral Islands of the Indonesian Archipelago fear that the risk of homogenising subsumption of their distinctive sub-national identities and cultures in the politically and culturally hegemonic Javanese culture. This fear has a valid basis since the P4 programme for the propagation of Pancasila promoted by the Soeharto regime was designed as a policy of homogenisation pivoted on Javanese culture and identity. Human Rights groups also criticise the proposed Bill because of the possibility that it can be used against the minorities to enforce a religiously influenced legal structure drawing on the principle of monotheistic faith, especially if the Radical Islamists come to power. The freedom of expression and free press could also be legally curtailed under Article 45 of the

Proposed Bill according to an assessment by the *Yayasan Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Indonesia*.

Another criticism by the Constitutional experts was the democratic deficit since the proposed Bill was introduced in Parliament for deliberation at the peak of the Covid 19 Pandemic, especially since the lockdown restrictions in place obviated the full participation of the legislators in the debate on the Bill. This would affect the legitimacy of the Law even if passed by the majority PDI-P because all the arguments against the proposed Bill would not have been arraigned before the Members of Parliament to make an informed decision.

Opposition to the Bill

The most stringent opposition to the proposed Bill has come, as was expected, from the radical Islamists. While essentially opposed to the concept of a non-Islamic national ideology since they visualise Pan-Islamism as the only valid ideology for a Muslim majority State, the radical Islamists have not overtly rejected the Pancasila, since that can lead to a ban on their organisations under the Law Number 02 of 2017 which proscribes any Organisation opposed to Pancasila. They have therefore taken recourse to criticise the proposed Bill for not incorporating Temporary People's Consultative Assembly Decree (TAP MPRS) Number 25 of 1966 (and its subsequent reaffirmation through People's Consultative Assembly Decree (TAP MPRS) Number 1 of 2003) which bans "atheist" Communism as a political ideology. They cite the attempts of President Wahid in 2000 to accommodate even the Communist ideology through revocation of the 1966 ban (which was defeated by a united Islamist coalition in the Parliament) as the precedent of Pancasila being appropriated by the "secular" Statist Nationalists. This fearmongering by the Radical Islamists of the imminent

resurgence of an “atheist” Communist takeover of Indonesian politics and subversion of Indonesian religious and moral values through the nullification of the first principle of monotheistic faith of Pancasila has found resonance in many sections of devoutly religious Indonesian society.

One of the contentious provisions of the proposed bill which has evoked a negative response from various democratic Islamic groups such as the largely Statist *Majelis Ulama Indonesia* and the Civil Islamists of *Muhammadiyah* and *Nahdlatul Ulama* is Article 7 of the proposed Bill which is seen as degrading the original Pancasila principles. Article 7 seeks to crystallise the operation of Pancasila through culturally contextualised faith, social democracy, and social nationalism, termed “*trisola*”. It further seeks to promote the (predominantly Javanese) socio-cultural institution of societal mutual co-operation, called *gotong-royong* which is termed “*ekasila*”. This operational truncation of the original five principles and especially the dismissiveness towards the first monotheistic principle of the Pancasila has evoked a sharp response even from mainstream political parties as well as Civil Islamists supportive of democracy. The reaction of the democratic Islamists diverging from their traditional support for Statist Nationalist allies and converging with the radical Islamic argument has been predicated on their apprehensions of Western cultural hegemonisation, declining moral cultural values which drives their support for social “shariatisation” in Indonesia (Kolig, 2005).

The unrelenting criticism by media on one hand and the vociferous protests backed by violently assertive radical Islamist groups such as 212 Rally Alumni (Sulistyanto, Sovianti, & Syaifuddin, 2019), further accentuated by the lack of support of its traditional democratic

supporters such as the Human Rights groups, *Majelis Ulama Indonesia* and the Civic Islamists forced the Government to issue a hasty retraction (officially a postponement of deliberations till after Covid 19 and obtaining a public opinion on the subject) of the proposed Bill. President Widodo also issued a statement upholding the continuation of the ban on Communism and his commitment to all five principles of the Pancasila ideology.

The Silent Factor-Military

While the ideological confrontation regarding the Pancasila Guidelines Bill, 2020 has publicly played out between the two political heavyweights of the Statist Nationalists and the Radical Islamists, (with Civil Islamists, Statist Islamists and Human Rights activists constituting a peripheral and largely non-political influence), the most potent and potentially powerful political actor in Indonesian politics is the Indonesian Military Establishment.

Originating in pre-Independence Indonesia largely from the *laskar* of the *Pasukan Sukarela Tentara Pembela Tanah Air*, the military of Indonesia played a crucial role in the Indonesian freedom movement. This historical legacy of the Military of Indonesia as a “People’s Army” gave rise to its self-perception of being *Sishankamrata* with a socio-political and ideological role for the Military and was functionalised through the strategic doctrine of *Dwifungsi* institutionalised during New Order regime of Soeharto (Sidwell, 1995). This envisaged an active involvement of the military not only in defence but also in politics and governance. However, the Military adheres to the *Sapta Marga* pledge and remains committed to upholding the Constitution of Indonesia and the Pancasila from all threats internal and external. Since the threat from external aggression is comparatively low given the geopolitical location and strategically

advantageous dispersion of the Indonesian archipelago, the Military has been engaged mostly in countering internal threats to the Unity of the Indonesian State and the supremacy of the Pancasila (Rabasa & Haseman, 2002).

With the organisation, training, and coercive capability to effect political changes, the Military in Indonesia is Statist and Nationalist and perceives both Revolutionary Communism as well as the rise of Radical Islam as a threat to the National Security. The military of Indonesia despite its voluntary abstinence from active involvement in politics in the twenty-first century, still enjoys the respect of the people and has the capacity to inflect political decisions because of its tutelary heritage and because of its praetorian ethos can play the role either of consolidating democracy in Indonesia or staging a coup taking it towards authoritarianism. Thus, the role of the military as the final arbiter in critical situations which threaten the Integrity of Indonesia or the pre-eminence of the Pancasila cannot be overruled (IPAC, 2016).

In the *Reformasi* era the threat of Communist Revolutions, apart from the secessionist movements in Papua, the insurgency in Aceh and Maluku and the secession of East Timor, has been practically eradicated in Indonesia. This period also witnessed civil-military relations deteriorate culminating in the hegemony of the Executive Office of the President and a general retreat to the barracks by the military especially after the Independence of East Timor and the dismissal of General Wiranto by President Wahid (Said, 2001). The recent threat perception of the military is attributable to the rise of revanchist radical Pan-Islamic Terrorist Groups such as the East Indonesia Mujahidin affiliated to Syria (Rahman Alamsyah & Hadiz, 2017). In this scenario, the relevant professional engagement of the Military of Indonesia

has been increasingly against the revanchist Radical Islamist ideology (Kurniawan, 2018).

The ruling Oligarchic Statist Nationalists have taken care to keep the military allied to their politics, both to neutralise the threat of Radical Islamists as well as the possibility of any military takeover. The Article 48 of the Pancasila Guidelines Bill, 2020 authorises the formation of the Agency for the reinvigoration of Pancasila Ideology (*Badan Pembinaan Ideologi Pancasila*), and despite postponing the Pancasila Guidelines Bill, 2020, the Jokowi Government has pushed through with the BPIP Bill, 2020 introduced in July 2020. This proposed BPIP is to be headed by a Civil Islamist academic Prof. Yudian Wahyudi, former Rector of the Sunan Kalijaga Islamic State University, who has courted controversy by his open denunciations of religion (widely perceived, though not explicitly stated by him, to be Islam) as the greatest obstacle to the realisation of Pancasila. It is also speculated that given the references to State Security in Article 48, the actual implementation of the BPIP agenda will be delegated to the military and police Commanders as a political integration of these coercive arms of the State with the promotion of the ideology of the ruling party of Statist Nationalists under President Jokowi. The expansion of the roles of the military and police serves the dual purpose of effective implementation of political objectives by professional military bolstering the image of the President while also opening avenues for appointment and promotion of Officers who would otherwise be superseded given the steep hierarchy of the armed forces, addressing a major cause of discontent among careerist Military Officers. The coercive militarist implementation of ideological policy for regulation of civil society and opposition parties, albeit under the excuse of Covid

19 related social regulation, through deployment of armed forces represents the consociational compact between the Military and the Statist Nationalist political elites for achievement of common ideological goals and has been equated by scholars to the militarisation of governance of the New Order era of Indonesia (Fealy, 2020).

This militarisation of governance for the achievement of ideologically determined development goals, is expected to lead to greater securitisation of the democracy in the guise of preserving order and increasing curbs on the rights and democratic freedoms of citizens (Warburton, 2016). Some scholars posit that given the propensity of President Jokowi to pursue his political goals articulated as ensuring economic development and securing political stability (a euphemism for styming the political ascendancy of Radical Islamists) through Military support, a decline in democratic rights and subtle rise of authoritarianism may also be expected (Power, 2018).

CONCLUSION

From the foregoing discursive analysis of the contemporary socio-politico-legal developments in Indonesia focused on the proposed Pancasila Guidelines Bill, 2020, the objective of the research to identify the *inter-se* interaction between the political elites, the praetorian military, the civil Islamists, on one hand and their unified ideological contestation against the increasingly assertive Radical Islamists was explored. The suspension of the Pancasila Guidelines Bill, 2020 is indicative of a changing political dynamic in which the military and the Statist Nationalists have moved closer due to shared common objectives and it is reflected in the increased role for the military officers in the civilian and political governance under President Jokowi.

Meanwhile the pacifist Civil Islamist who are democratic nationalists have been largely sidelined due to their discomfiture at the rampant corruption, nepotism, dynastic politics, and their apprehensions against increased militarized restrictions which have emerged as the new norm in post-pandemic Indonesia. An ideological quandary confronting the Civil Islamists is that some of their core ideological objectives, such as those regarding the social role of *Syariah*, are shared by the Radical Islamists rather than the Statist Nationalists or the Military. At the same time the violent extremism and exclusionary fundamentalism of the Radical Islamists mitigates against the core inclusive nationalism that is the basis of the social outlook of the Civil Islamists. The fate of the Pancasila Regulation Bill, 2020 is an indicator of the ideological vacillation of the Civil Islamists.

On the other hand, the radical Islamists are emerging as a political force to reckon with in Indonesia. The popular disenchantment with politicians, restrictions and the economic slowdown has made radical Islamist ideology a viable alternative.

The hypothesis that the Statist Nationalist political elites in Indonesia and their tenuous praetorian Military supporters will continue to face political challenges from resurgent radical Islamists with an expanding support base in Indonesian Society with the legislative and legal spheres of the State emerging as prominent arenas for ideological contestation appears plausible. The determinative role appears to be by the Civil Islamists, who, while they are marginal in electoral politics, still possess considerable social, educational, and religious influence, which can metaphorically tip the scales of power.

This article is a preliminary exploration of an interesting political

phenomenon. The implications of ascendant Radical Islamisation on inclusivity of society and polity in Indonesian democracy and the future of the Statist Pancasila vis a vis Islamist are still emergent.

The ideological contestations between these two competing visions of the future and destiny of Indonesia, provide a fertile research subject for scholars to document the developments for posterity and contribute to the refinement of a theoretical understanding of events.

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