

Media and power: a critical discourse analysis of Habib Rizieq's coverage in Indonesian mainstream media

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Abstract

The aims of this article is to see the Indonesian media framing toward Habib Rizieq after returning to Indonesia, from Saudi Arabia in 2020. Habib Rizieq Shihab has become one of the media's figures since returning from Saudi Arabia in November 2020. Habib Rizieq is one of the foremost religious figures who has fought or delegitimized Joko Widodo's leadership since 2014. Habib Rizieq has fought for the enforcement of Islamic law in Indonesia and against Jokowi's regime, which he sees as less pro-Islam. The theory used in this article is framing theory. This article analyzes the mainstream media's framing in Indonesia, namely Kompas, Tempo, Jakarta Post, and Republika, in reporting on Habib Rizieq Shihab's figure. In this study, we processed data using the Nvivo 12 and VOSviewer application tools to see media sentiment. In this research, we read 317 news from the four mainstream medias in Indonesia from October to December 2020. We use four keywords in the framing analysis: positive, negative, moderately positive, and moderately negative. This study indicates that moderately negative framing is the highest in Indonesia's mainstream media coverage on Habib Rizieq Shihab's figure. It means that Habib Rizieq failed to reconstruct the power of the masses against Joko Widodo's regime.

Keywords: Habib Rizieq Shihab, media framing, FPI, critical discourse

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Introduction

Indonesia is the majority Muslim state with 87,5 percent of the population. Islam also has significant role in Indonesian political life's history (Al Qurtuby, 2020). Besides, Indonesia is also recognized as the third-largest democracy in the world after India and the United States (US). Indonesia is one country where democracy and Islam may coexist, having successfully removed Soeharto from office in 1998 through popular power, massive student demonstrations (Sahide & Satris, 2021). The success of Indonesia, as the majority Muslim state, to build democracy was recognized by Hillary Clinton, president candidate of the United States in 2016. Hillary said that: "If you want to know whether Islam, democracy, modernity, and women's rights can coexist, go to Indonesia." Hillary Clinton and Madeleine Albright praised Indonesia's democratization as the ideal model for the Arab Spring (Hoesterey, 2013).

However, the relationship between Islamic groups and the state did not always run harmoniously. For example, in the New Order era, Soeharto took less favorable policies for Islamic groups. Although at the end of his leadership, Soeharto approached Islamic groups again, and one proof of this was supporting the establishment of the *Indonesian Muslim Scholars Association* (Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia/ICMI) in

1990 (Azhar et al., 2020). Besides, Soeharto also built many mosques as places of worship for the Indonesian Muslim community. They are called "*Masjid Pancasila*".

After Soeharto stepped down in 1998, Indonesia entered a reformation era with more room for freedom. Reformation opened the door for democratization in Indonesia. After the reformation era, Indonesia has succeeded in building democracy juxtaposed with Islam. There is no longer any restraint against Islamic groups. Islamic groups have also started to establish Islamic parties as a forum for channeling their aspirations. Amien Rais, a Muhammadiyah leader, founded the Party of National Mandate/*Partai Amanat Nasional* (PAN), Abdurrahman Wahid, a Nahdatul Ulama (NU) figure, founded the National Awakening Party/*Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa* (PKB), and several other Islamic parties that emerged after Soeharto's New Order regime stepped down such as Justice Political Party/*Partai Keadilan* (PK) then become the Prosperous Justice Party/*Partai Keadilan Sejahtera* (PKS). One of the prominent figures from PKS at the time was Hidayat Nurwahid (Mukrimin, 2012).

At the beginning of the reformation, Islam had dominated the national political stage. Amien Rais became Chairman of the People's Consultative Assembly (PCA) for the period 1999-2004, Abdurrahman Wahid was elected as the third President of Indonesia at the 1999 PCA General Session, although he had to be deposed in 2001 and replaced by Megawati Soekarno-Putri, a figure from the nationalist Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (*PDI P*) (Fuad, 2014). The Vice President of Indonesia of Megawati's administration was Hamzah Has from United Development Party/*Partai Persatuan Pembangunan* (PPP), the Islamic party has existed since new order era of Soeharto.

After that, Islamic groups no longer controlled the national political stage. Islamic parties were no longer able to build solid political strength in the face of nationalist parties. In the 2004 general election, Golkar came out as the winner (Ricklefs, 2008). In the 2009 general election, the Democrats came out as the winners, and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), as the central figure of the Democrats, came out as the winners for the second term. In the 2014 general election, PDI P came out as the winner, both legislative and executive, where Joko Widodo (Jokowi) was elected as President of Indonesia accompanied by Jusuf Kalla, vice president (Sahide, 2020). PDI P won the 2019 democratic party again, and Jokowi was reelected as President of Indonesia accompanied by KH. Ma'ruf Amin for the 2019-2024 period, with the total votes for Jokowi-Ma'ruf reaching 85,607,362 or 55.50 percent of the votes, Prabowo-Sandi's votes was 68,650,239 or 44.50 percent of the votes (Sahide, 2022). During this Jokowi era, Islamic groups began to rise by carrying out identity politics against Jokowi, which he saw as not taking sides with the Islamic world.

The emergence of Jokowi as a Presidential Candidate in 2014 and 2019 revived religious-based identity politics (Islam). Jokowi has been widely rumored by the media and specific figures in Islam as one of the more miniature pro-Islam figures, even seen as giving space for the ideology of communism to develop again in Indonesia (Sebastian & Wanto, 2019). Therefore, since his emergence as one of the vital figures to become the number one person in this Republic, Jokowi has received many attacks on these two issues. The 2014 and 2019 presidential elections also generated polarization for the Indonesian people who gave their voting rights. The public opinion that has been awakened is that the people who chose Jokowi were not 'Islamic' while those who chose Prabowo Subianto were 'Islamic'. The reason behind the choice of Jokowi and PDI P in taking Ma'ruf Amin as the Vice-President candidate in 2019 in order to counter the attack toward Jokowi where China is prominent in coloring Jokowi's

campaign during the general election in 2019. Ma'ruf Amin is the leader of Nahdatul Ulama (NU), the Islamic mass organization constituting relatively 60 million Indonesians. Besides, Ma'ruf Amien was the Chief of Indonesian Council of Ulama/*Majelis Ulama Indonesia* (MUI)(Sahide, 2022).

This is a form of identity politics with religious issues strongly built in the 2014 and 2019 Indonesian presidential elections, in which only two pairs of candidates participated. The 2014 and 2019 presidential elections have become the most 'hot' political contestation in the cycle of democracy after the rolling reform era. The term appears "*El Classico*" to describe this political contestation (Tribunnews.com, 2019). The term is taken from the classic battle of the two Spanish football giants, Real Madrid and Barcelona, where the two teams' matches are always in high tension, always hot, and extreme fanaticism from their supporters. The 2014 and 2019 presidential elections also took place with high tension, heat and also gave birth to extreme support groups that did not finish when the presidential elections were over. The 2014 and 2019 presidential election left society further polarized due to political identity (religion) (Bagir, 2021).

Therefore, when the Joko Widodo-Jusuf Kalla pair came out as winners in the 2014 presidential election by obtaining 53.1% of the vote (Aji & Dartanto, 2018), the rise of hardline Islamic groups that saw Jokowi as a threat to Islam always carried out attacks, both in the form of discourse on social media and actual political movements as a form of rejection of Jokowi's leadership (Fionna & Hutchinson, 2019). One of the Islamic figures who loudly voiced resistance against Jokowi was the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), Habib Rizieq Shihab. Rizieq Shihab, the founder of FPI in 1998, is a cleric inspired by Salafism, an ideology which had evolved since the 1980s, although it had been constrained by Suharto's political interest, who serves as the group's the Grand Imam in Indonesia (Yilmaz et al., 2022). FPI is also known as the conservative Islamic group in Indonesia (Bagir, 2021). FPI massively conducted sweeping (closing places of immorality) and demonstrations considered irrelevant to Islamic sharia (Waty & Kamaruddin, 2021).

The FPI is a far-right, populist social and political group that wants Indonesia to become more Islamic. The FPI presents itself as an adversary of the nation's purportedly secular and immoral "elites" and a defender of the Indonesian people (Yilmaz et al., 2022). Habib Rizieq had organized demonstration since 2014 and then became a leading figure in carrying out political resistance movements against Jokowi, especially in the 2016-2017 DKI Jakarta regional head elections (Regional Election) (Bagir, 2021). The polarization and politics of religious identity in the Jakarta elections are getting stronger (Hadiz, 2019). The people of DKI Jakarta, but all Indonesian people and even the world because of the massive media coverage.

This regional election was later referred to as the local election' as if it were presidential election'. This is because the media's attention and coverage are not much different during the presidential election. Especially when Basuki Tjahaya Purnama (Ahok), a candidate for governor who was deemed to have insulted religion (Islam) from his political speech in Labor Island/*Pulau Buruh* (Syahputra, 2020).

Basuki claimed that the other contenders, particularly the orthodox Islamic organisation, had politicised a Qur'anic passage regarding the need to "elect a Muslim leader"; instead of saying, "They lied using the Qur'anic verse," the statement read, "The Qur'anic verse is a lie." The anti-Ahok campaign reached a whole new level after Basuki (Ahok) made a political declaration. The election campaign erupted into chaos. Large-scale protests known as *Aksi Bela Islam* (Defend Islam Action) characterised it (Bagir, 2021).



Figure 1. Mass of Defend Islam Action in Jakarta

Source: Republika online

Ahok is a figure with Chinese ethnicity and also from a minority religion (Christian). Ahok's speech aroused Islamic groups to carry out the 'Action to Defend Islam 212' 2016 and was followed by a similar action in 2017 (Pamungkas & Octaviani, 2017). To symbolize the protest, they created unique numbers for the taglines, such as 1410, 411, 212, 112, 212 (Reunion), 313, and 55. Each demonstration activity was focusing on echoing the mass invitation to join the IDA. It took place on December 2, 2016, which became 212, at the National Monument (Monas). The demonstrations were commanded by the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) (Rizkimawati & Kusumawardhana, 2021). The 2016 anti-Ahok demonstrations served as a warning about the rising influence of Islamism in Indonesia and the failure of mainstream political parties to oppose it. According to FPI, there are seven million members of this organisation in Indonesia (Yilmaz et al., 2022).

The targets were Ahok and Jokowi. Habib Rizieq, as the leader of FPI, appeared as a figure who was at the forefront of defending Islam against Ahok and Jokowi. As a result, Ahok lost in the 2017 DKI Jakarta regional election contest, and the winner was the Anies Baswedan-Sandiaga Salahuddin Uno pair who received support from groups involved in the 'Action to Defend Islam 212' (Törnquist, 2019). After the Defend Islam campaign succeeded in winning over Anies, who was seen as a symbol of Islamic victory, Habib Rizieq then appeared as a hero of the Islamic group. Some even crowned him as the Grand Imam of the Islamic Community in Indonesia. However, Habib Rizieq was then confronted with a legal case not long after Anies won the DKI Jakarta regional election. Habib Rizieq then left Indonesia for Saudi Arabia. Many observers see that Habib Rizieq was absent from the legal process in Indonesia. However, this was denied by Habib Rizieq and his followers (FPI). Habib Rizieq could only return to Indonesia in November 2020 (Republika.co.id, 2020).

His presence again stirred up Indonesia's political world, which was greeted by supporters ranging from Soekarno Hatta International Airport to installing thousands of billboards in Jakarta and its surroundings (Republika.co.id, 2020). Habib Rizieq then became the main topic of national media coverage in Indonesia, print, electronic, or online media. The return of Habib Rizieq sparked concern for the Jokowi-Ma'ruf Amien government that he would try to take advantage of opposition forces to fight against a

regime that he considered had 'wronged Muslims. The government then responded by dissolving the Islamic Defenders Front at the end of December 2020 (Da Costa & Lamb, 2020).



Figure 2. Picture of Welcoming Habib Rizieq Shihab in 2020

Source: *Republika Online*

Actually there are many articles written about Habib Rizieq, Islamic Defenders Front, and the relations between Islam and state in Indonesia such as the article written by Mark Woodward and friends entitled “The Islamic Defenders Front: Demonization, Violence and the State in Indonesia.” In this article, Woodward and friends elaborate how Islamic Defenders Front uses civil discourse to build credibility and respectability and hate speech and demonization to justify violent attacks on groups and individuals it views as wicked or religiously aberrant (Woodward et al., 2014). Another article written by Gabriel Facal that elaborates the history of Islamic Defenders Front, the dynamic of its relations to states institutions and its impact on the growing intolerance in Indonesia (Facal, 2020). Chaider S. Bamualim wrote an article explaining the history of the Islamic Defenders Front, its ideology and also the dynamics of its relationship with institutions and elites in Indonesia (Bamualim, 2011). Some other articles have been written about this topic, however no articles discussing the media framing toward Habib Rizieq. This article reads about the coverage and framing of the national mainstream media in Indonesia against Habib Rizieq since returning to his homeland from exile in Saudi Arabia.

Research Methods

This article aims to find out about the framing of the mainstream media in Indonesia in Habib Rizieq Shihab's coverage. The author sees how the sentiment in the national mainstream media reports on Habib Rizieq Shihab's figure. In this article, the author uses four media as a source of information.

Table 1. Media data sources

News Name	Website	Number of News
Kompas	https://www.kompas.com	61
Tempo	https://www.tempo.com	70
Republika	https://republika.co.id	160
The Jakarta Post	https://www.thejakartapost.com	25
Total		317

Source: *processed by author*

These four media generally represent the media reader community groups in Indonesia. *Kompas* is the leading media in encouraging the development of moderate and tolerant religious understanding. On the other hand, *Republika* is a media that has a historical position as a 'match' for Kompas to voice Islamic groups' aspirations. *Tempo* is a nationalist media, while *The Jakarta Post* is a media that represents many corporations in Indonesia. *The Jakarta Post* is the national media written in English. Thus, the four media can reflect or represent the framing of media coverage of Habib Rizieq Shihab's figure. In this study, the authors used two tools to analyze Habib Rizieq Shihab's media sentiments: 1.) Toll crosstab analysis. 2.) Word cloud analysis tool. There are four keywords that we use in framing analysis, namely Positive, Negative, Moderately Positive, Enough Negative.

Result and Discussion

To answer the research question, we sampled (1) all keyword metadata from articles published in Scopus database data from 2014 to 2013. Keywords and abstracts provide indicators of dominant themes and perspectives in a publication and are, therefore, suitable for tracing possible theoretical trends within the field. Of course, article writers have no standard procedure about what keywords to choose and what to include in the abstract. Nonetheless, abstracts and keywords represent conventions or the content of a piece of writing. The abstract is a possible, even desirable, location to clarify the theoretical insertion and contribution of the work in a concise form. The following is the development of theory in media framing in the last decade.




Figure 3. Portrait of the development of theory in Media Framing
 Source: Own Elaboration Using (Citespace)

Based on the figure above, several significant theories were used in studying media framing, including Authoritarianism (Krause, 2014; Lu et al., 2014; Tang & Huhe, 2014). Inspired by agenda-setting theory and media framing, the findings suggest that news influences support for authoritarian crime control and decreases public trust in government institutions. Next, Ethnic Media (Wasserman & Maweu, 2014). Ethnic identity is considered one of the critical factors shaping people's political beliefs; for journalists and media practitioners in particular, ethnic identity also influences normative positions. The conflicting loyalties between ethnic ownership and journalistic

norms regarding professionalism and independence especially emerge during democratic elections and national referendums.

Then, Rinella Cere, and Yvonne Jewkes (2014) by looking at media framing from the side of Crime in three different European countries: England, Norway, and Italy. His research findings show the importance of values that determine the appropriateness of news. The latter is Democracy; Camaj (2014) looks at media use and political trust in emerging democracies. The most important dimension of political trust is the media's institutional efficiency and honesty assessment.

Our observations of media framing theory development are summarized in figures that offer an overview of the development of existing and possible media framing theory in practice. The contributions presented in this theory will form a roadmap for future research.




Figure 4. Research Framework

Source: processed by author

Media Statement

This round of the conversation will examine how the mainstream media in Indonesia framed Habib Rizieq Shihab's return to the country on November 10, 2020. From the beginning, Habib Rizieq and the FPI have been portrayed as the extreme group. The FPI, led by Shihab, has brought together a Jemaah (group of its adherents) to formulate religious policies and organised *laskars* (soldiers) to uphold the Indonesian principle of amar ma'ruf nahi munkar (dictating what is proper and prohibiting what is evil). However, the *laskars*' frequent use of violence against marginalised groups and allegedly immoral establishments like nightclubs, pubs, and cafés has generated a great deal of controversy in Indonesia (Bamualim, 2011). In this part, there are four mainstream medias that we take the news about Habib Rizieq Shihab. Then, we do the framing analysis. The four media outlets are *Kompas*, *The Jakarta Post*, *Tempo*, and *Republika*.

Kompas

As the largest and most influential print media in Indonesia, *Kompas* did not escape reporting related to the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) leader before returning to Indonesia. From November 2020 to the end of January 2021, 61 news reports in

Kompas daily covered Habib Rizieq. From the 61 news reports, we can see that news at *Kompas*' on Habib Rizieq Shihab tends to be *moderately negative* with a percentage of 50.82%. The news describes HRS with criteria *moderately positive* with a percentage of 39.4%. Meanwhile, news in the harmful category as a percentage of 8.25%, and the last framing is *positive* with a percentage of 1.64%.




Figure 5. Kompas Statement

Source: Nvivo12 plus analysis

This framing shows that the majority of news daily *Kompas* reported Habib Rizieq with framing *moderately negative*. Of course, this will also impact the FPI leader's image in the *Kompas* reading community daily. Therefore, if the presence and political attitude of the FPI are faced with the government, then Habib Rizieq is perceived as the wrong party. This means that the frontal struggle and preaching against the government did not get a broad response from the Indonesian people. Indonesia is known as the moderate Muslim society.

Tempo

Tempo daily published 70 news related to Habib Rizieq Shihab during the same period. Of the 70 news, 52.86% of the news described Habib Rizieq with *Moderately Negative*. The news describes it with framing *Moderately Positive* of 45.71%. News with framing *Positive* of 1.43% and framing *Negative* of 0%.




Figure 6. Tempo Statement

Source: Nvivo12 plus analysis

The results of this analysis of the news framing of the *Tempo* daily show the same trend as the *Kompas* news, where most of the news framing is *Moderately Negative*, although it has a slightly different percentage.

Jakarta Post

The third mainstream media that focuses on Habib Rizieq is *the Jakarta Post*, owned by PT Bina Media Tenggara. The only mainstream print media in Indonesia that uses English so that its readers are not only Indonesians but also foreigners in Indonesia. The news in the *Jakarta Post* is not as much as *Kompas* and *Tempo* regarding Habib Rizieq Shihab. In the *Jakarta Post* daily, there are only 25 news stories that carry the FPI leadership theme.




Figure 7. The Jakarta Post Statement

Source: Nvivo12 plus analysis

From the 25 news stories, we can see that the news framed with moderately *negative* was 56%, while the news framed with moderately *positive* was 44%. Daily news framing is the same as the two mainstream media above, where new *Moderately Negative* is the highest. What is slightly different from the *Jakarta Post* is that there is no positive or negative news framing.

Republika

Republika is one of the mainstream media in Indonesia established as a medium to accommodate Muslims' aspirations. It is also often mentioned that *Republika* is a printed media established as a counter-form to the *Kompas* daily at the national level. So the news framing will be very different.




Figure 8. Republika Statement

Source: Nvivo12 plus analysis

Republika is thicker in its Islamic values. Therefore, *Republika* is the media that contains the most news related to Habib Rizieq Shihab. From November 2020 to January 2021, 160 news items had coherence with Habib Rizieq Shihab. In describing Habib Rizieq Shihab, *Republika* was dominated by criteria *Moderately Positive* with a

gain of 49.38%, but only slightly different from the news, which gave a picture in the perception of *Moderately Negative* with a gain of 48.13% and *positive* with a gain of 1.88%. *The negative images are the percentage of tiny with a score of 0.63%.*

Discussion

The results of the above data indicate that most of the national mainstream media framing in reporting on Habib Rizieq Shihab's figure is *moderately negative*. Only *Republika* did *moderately positive framing* greater than *moderately negative*, but the difference was only one percent, 49% (*moderately positive*) versus 48% (*moderately negative*). Therefore, the language and symbolic religion (Islam) used by Habib Rizieq in carrying out political resistance against Joko Widodo's regime is not seen as something that has a positive meaning (goodness).

On the other hand, FPI Grand Imam Habib Rizieq Shihab's return from Saudi Arabia raised concerns about the threat to the Republic of Indonesia's Unitary State/*Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia* (NKRI). FPI was founded by Habib Rizieq with the ultimate objective of promoting legislative changes meant to "Islamize" Indonesia's secular laws. Rizieq pursued this goal in mind and extended the battle to the political sphere in addition to the streets (Bamualim, 2011). Habib Rizieq fled Indonesia for Saudi Arabia as a result of his opposition to the Jokowi administration, which was seen as incompatible with Islamic principles. Habib Rizieq is a figure who has been open about his political opposition to Jokowi, including the 212 campaign in 2016 and 2017 to remove Ahok as Governor of DKI Jakarta (Makahasin & Sugiarto, 2020).

However, the Center for Political Communication Studies (CPCS) survey results shows that the number of people who want Indonesia to be a unitary state of Indonesia's Unitary Republic is still relatively high, namely 81.5%. Whereas, respondents want Indonesia to be the state religion (Islam), as championed by Habib Rizieq is 13, 3 percent. Meanwhile, the remaining 5.2 percent stated that they did not know/did not answer (JPNN, 2020).

This shows that the Indonesian people's acceptance of the figure and struggle of Habib Rizieq is still deficient and cannot be separated from the framing of the mainstream media in Indonesia. One of the factors that caused the high negative sentiment in media coverage of Habib Rizieq was when he gathered a mass of supporters after returning to Indonesia because moderate Islam is the kind of Islam that is growing and becoming more accepted in Indonesia. This moderate religious understanding was developed by the two largest mass organizations in Indonesia, namely Nahdatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah (Nashir et al., 2019).



Figure 9. Word Cloud
Sources: news processed using Nvivo 12 Application

Thus, one of the issues highlighted and framed negatively by the four media mainstream above is the crowd's question. It can be seen from the data processing world cloud through Nvivo 12.

We can also see from the results of the survey, which was released on November 26, 2020, by Saiful Mujani Research and Consulting (SMRC), which compared the level of knowledge and preferences of national figures in Indonesia is where the level of liking for Habib Rizieq is the lowest. Even the level of public preference for political figures is higher than that of Habib Rizieq Shihab.




Figure 10. Perception of the figures
Source: (Saiful Mujani Research and Consulting, 2020)

The low level of acceptance of Habib Rizieq among the Indonesian people can be closely linked to the framing used by mainstream media in Indonesia, where moderately negative coverage dominates. Media outlets have played a significant role in shaping public perception, particularly by portraying Habib Rizieq and the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) as a radical group from the outset. This consistent framing has reinforced negative associations with both Rizieq and the FPI, which has affected the general public's view of them. The media's portrayal not only highlights controversial aspects of their actions but also taps into deeper societal concerns about extremism and radicalism, amplifying the negative image of Rizieq and his organization.

Moreover, the FPI's historical involvement in acts of violence in Indonesia, often justified in the name of religion, has further compounded this negative image (Woodward et al., 2014). Media reports on these incidents have contributed to solidifying the perception of the group as a disruptive and radical force within society. Despite any political or social support they may receive from certain segments, the broader Indonesian population has remained wary due to the repeated association of the FPI with violence and religious intolerance.

Conclusion

In the article by A. Khoiri and colleagues, titled "The Political Islam Perspective of Social Movement Theory: A Case Study of FPI in Indonesia," the authors argue that the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) can be divided into three distinct phases by analyzing both the political landscape and the organization's activities. The first phase is the constructive phase, which spans from the FPI's founding in 1998 until the end of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's presidency. During this period, the FPI operated with significant influence and freedom. The second phase is the agitative period, marked by the rise of Ahok as governor of Jakarta, which triggered the Islamic Defense Action. This phase ended when Rizieq Shihab fled to Saudi Arabia. The third phase, termed the deconstructive phase, began with Rizieq's return from Saudi Arabia. Despite efforts to rebuild its mass following, the FPI ultimately failed and was officially designated a banned organization (Khoiri et al., 2024).

The negative framing of Habib Rizieq in the four major Indonesian media outlets following his return from Saudi Arabia in 2020 supports Khoiri and colleagues' thesis. The media's portrayal contributed to Rizieq's inability to rally mass support against President Joko Widodo's administration, reinforcing his failure to reestablish the influence he once held.

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